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Mission Chinese neem die groot appel aan

Mission Chinese neem die groot appel aan


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Die San Francisco -hotspot brei uit na die ooskus

Nadat hulle die eetwêreld die afgelope jaar bestorm het, het die duo agter San Francisco's Mission Chinese Food, sjef Danny Bowien en restaurateur Anthony Myint, hierdie week aangekondig dat hulle hul visier aan die ooskus wil rig.

Die New York Times' Diner's Journal het gisteraand berig dat die nuwe Mission Chinese Food -tak in die Rhong Tiam -tuin hierdie lente in Manhattan se Lower East Side. Die konsep en spyskaart sal grotendeels getrou bly aan die oorspronklike, wat bekende Amerikaanse-Chinese geregte met 'n kenmerkende unieke uitstraling beteken-soos verkoelde bokwietnoedels met hambouillon en gesoute forel, en tee-gerookte paling.

Die tak van San Francisco van Mission Chinees Food is 'n pop-up-restaurant wat binne-in Lung Shan in die missiedistrik van die stad werk. Hierdie nuwe plek sal die Rhong Tiam -tuin oorneem, wat na verwagting op 31 sal sluitst van hierdie maand, volgens hul webwerf.


Die belangrikste grens van China is denkbeeldig: die Hu -lyn

Hu Line, wat in 1935 die eerste keer geteken is, illustreer die volgehoue ​​demografiese skeuring - hoe Beijing dit gaan hanteer, sal die land se toekoms bepaal.

Die westelike deel van China, meer as die helfte van sy grondgebied, besit slegs 6% van die bevolking. Die 'Hu Line' skei die land se wilde en leë weste van die baie meer bevolkte ooste.

  • In 1935 trek die demograaf Hu Huanyong 'n streep oor 'n kaart van China.
  • Die 'Hu Line' illustreer 'n merkwaardige skeiding in die bevolkingsverdeling van China.
  • Die kloof bly relevant, nie net vir die hede van China nie, maar ook vir die toekoms.

Gevolglike kenmerk

'N Bader in Blagoveshchensk, op die Russiese oewer van die Amoer. Oorkant die rivier: die Chinese stad Heihe.

Krediet: Dimitar Dilkoff/AFP via Getty Images

Die Hu -lyn is waarskynlik die belangrikste kenmerk van China se geografie, met demografiese, ekonomiese, kulturele en politieke implikasies vir die verlede, hede en toekoms van die land. Tog vind u dit nie op enige amptelike kaart van China nie, en ook nie op die werklike terrein van die Volksrepubliek self nie.

Daar is geen monumente op die eindpunte nie: nie in Heihe in die noorde nie, net 'n ysige swem oor die Amur van Blagoveshchensk, in die Verre Ooste van Rusland en ook nie in Tengchong nie, die subtropiese suidelike stad tussen die heuwels wat Myanmar inloop. Ook nie oral op die 2,330 myl (3,750 km) diagonaal wat albei kolletjies verbind nie. Die Hu Line is so onsigbaar as wat dit denkbeeldig is.

Die punt wat die Hu Line maak, is egter net so relevant soos toe dit eers voorgestel is. In 1935 gebruik 'n Chinese demograaf Hu Huanyong 'n handgetekende kaart van die lyn om sy artikel oor 'The Distribution of China's Population' in die Chinese Journal of Geography te illustreer.

Die punt van die artikel en van die kaart: die bevolking van China is oneweredig versprei, en nie net 'n bietjie nie, maar baie. Soos, baie.

  • Die gebied wes van die lyn beslaan 64 persent van China se gebied, maar bevat slegs 4 persent van die land se bevolking.
  • Omgekeerd het 96 persent van die Chinese op slegs 36 persent van die grond oos van die 'geo-demografiese afbakeningslyn', soos Hu dit genoem het, gewoon.

Baie het in die nabye eeu in China verander. Die swak post-keiserlike republiek is nou 'n hoogs gesentraliseerde wêreldmoondheid. Die bevolking het byna verdriedubbel, van ongeveer 500 miljoen tot byna 1,4 miljard. Maar die grondbeginsels van die wanbalans het feitlik dieselfde gebly.

Selfs al het China se gebied dit nie gedoen nie: in 1946 erken China die onafhanklikheid van Mongolië, wat die gebied wes van die Hu -lyn krimp. In 2015 was die verspreiding egter soos volg:

  • Wes van die lyn, 6 persent van die bevolking op 57 persent van die gebied (gemiddelde bevolkingsdigtheid: 39,6 inwoners per vierkante myl (15,3/km2).
  • Oos van die lyn, 94 persent van die bevolking op 43 persent van die gebied (gemiddelde bevolkingsdigtheid: 815,3 inwoners per vierkante myl (314,8/km2).

Aanhoudende tweespalt

Hu Huanyong se oorspronklike handgetekende kaart van China, met bevolkingsdigtheid en die nou bekende lyn (verbeter vir sigbaarheid).

Krediet: Chinese Journal of Geography (1935) - publieke domein.

Waarom is hierdie demografiese tweespalt so aanhoudend? In twee woorde: klimaat en terrein. Oos van die lyn is die land platter en natter, wat beteken dat dit makliker is om te boer, en dus makliker om genoeg voedsel vir 'n steeds groter bevolking te produseer. Wes van die lyn: woestyne, berge en plato's. Baie strenger terrein met 'n droër klimaat, wat dit baie moeiliker maak om groot hoeveelhede mense te onderhou.

En waar die mense is, volg die res. Oos van die lyn is feitlik die hele infrastruktuur en ekonomie van China. Saans sien satelliete die gebied in die ooste blink met lanternagtige stringe lig, terwyl die weste 'n kombers is van byna totale duisternis, wat soms afgebreek word deur tekens van lewe. In China se 'Wilde Weste' is die BBP per capita gemiddeld 15 persent laer as in die ywerige ooste.

'N Bykomende faktor kenmerk China se bevolkingsverskil: terwyl die land oor die algemeen etnies baie homogeen is - 92 persent is Han -Chinese - die meeste van die 8 persent wat die etniese minderhede van China uitmaak, woon wes van die lyn. Dit is veral die geval in Tibet en Xinjiang, twee nominaal outonome streke met nie-Han etniese meerderhede.

Hierdie kombinasie van ekonomiese en etniese wanbalanse beteken dat die Hu Line nie net 'n volgehoue ​​eienaardigheid is nie, maar 'n moontlike probleem - ten minste vanuit Beijing se perspektief. Kultureel en geografies ver van die ooste van die land, het Tibetane en Oeigoers sterk teenkanting teen die sentraliserende neigings van China aangeteken, wat dikwels tot onderdrukking gelei het.

Langtermyn strategie

Straataansig in Tengchong, op die grens van China met Myanmar.

Krediet: China Photos/Getty Images

Maar onderdrukking is nie die sentrale regering se langtermynstrategie nie. Die plan is om te kalmeer deur vordering. China se 'Manifest Destiny' het 'n naam. In 1999 het Jiang Zemin, destydse sekretaris-generaal van die Chinese Kommunistiese Party, die veldtog 'Ontwikkel die Weste' geloods. Die idee agter die slagspreuk behou sy politieke geldeenheid. In die afgelope dekade het die Chinese premier, Li Keqiang, die land herhaaldelik aangespoor om die Hu -lyn te "deurbreek" om die westelike helfte van China te moderniseer.

Die ontwikkelingstrategie het 'n ekonomiese invalshoek-die toevoeging van nywerheid en infrastruktuur om die BBP per capita van die streek tot die gemiddelde van die land te verhoog. Maar die plaaslike bevolking is bang dat vooruitgang bevolkingsverandering sal meebring: 'n toestroming van genoeg interne migrante uit die ooste om die plaaslike etniese balans tot hul nadeel te bring.

Die etniese minderhede van China word amptelik erken en geniet sekere regte, maar as dit minderhede in hul eie streke word, beteken dit min meer as die reg om volksliedere en danse op te voer. Die Sowjets was voorheen meesters in hierdie tegniek.

Sal China dieselfde pad volg? Die vraag sal beantwoord word as en wanneer die Hu -lyn van relevansie verdwyn, hoeveel van die etniese diversiteit van die weste is opgeoffer vir ekonomiese vooruitgang.

Vreemde kaarte #1071


Die belangrikste grens van China is denkbeeldig: die Hu -lyn

Hu Line, wat in 1935 die eerste keer geteken is, illustreer die volgehoue ​​demografiese skeuring - hoe Beijing dit gaan hanteer, sal die land se toekoms bepaal.

Die westelike deel van China, meer as die helfte van sy grondgebied, besit slegs 6% van die bevolking. Die 'Hu Line' skei die land se wilde en leë weste van die baie meer bevolkte ooste.

  • In 1935 trek die demograaf Hu Huanyong 'n streep oor 'n kaart van China.
  • Die 'Hu Line' illustreer 'n merkwaardige skeiding in die bevolkingsverdeling van China.
  • Die kloof bly relevant, nie net vir die hede van China nie, maar ook vir die toekoms.

Gevolglike kenmerk

'N Bader in Blagoveshchensk, op die Russiese oewer van die Amoer. Oorkant die rivier: die Chinese stad Heihe.

Krediet: Dimitar Dilkoff/AFP via Getty Images

Die Hu -lyn is waarskynlik die belangrikste kenmerk van China se geografie, met demografiese, ekonomiese, kulturele en politieke implikasies vir die verlede, hede en toekoms van die land. Tog vind u dit nie op enige amptelike kaart van China nie, en ook nie op die werklike terrein van die Volksrepubliek self nie.

Daar is geen monumente op die eindpunte nie: nie in Heihe in die noorde nie, net 'n ysige swem oor die Amur vanaf Blagoveshchensk, in die Verre Ooste van Rusland en ook nie in Tengchong nie, die subtropiese suidelike stad tussen die heuwels wat in Myanmar rol. Ook nie oral op die 2,330 myl (3,750 km) diagonaal wat albei kolletjies verbind nie. Die Hu Line is so onsigbaar as wat dit denkbeeldig is.

Maar die punt wat die Hu Line maak, is net so relevant soos toe dit eers voorgestel is. In 1935 gebruik 'n Chinese demograaf Hu Huanyong 'n handgetekende kaart van die lyn om sy artikel oor 'The Distribution of China's Population' in die Chinese Journal of Geography te illustreer.

Die punt van die artikel en van die kaart: die bevolking van China is oneweredig versprei, en nie net 'n bietjie nie, maar baie. Soos, baie.

  • Die gebied wes van die lyn beslaan 64 persent van China se gebied, maar bevat slegs 4 persent van die land se bevolking.
  • Omgekeerd het 96 persent van die Chinese op slegs 36 persent van die grond oos van die 'geo-demografiese afbakeningslyn', soos Hu dit genoem het, gewoon.

Baie het in die nabye eeu in China verander. Die swak post-keiserlike republiek is nou 'n hoogs gesentraliseerde wêreldmoondheid. Die bevolking het byna verdriedubbel, van ongeveer 500 miljoen tot byna 1,4 miljard. Maar die grondbeginsels van die wanbalans het feitlik dieselfde gebly.

Selfs al het China se gebied dit nie gedoen nie: in 1946 erken China die onafhanklikheid van Mongolië, en verminder die gebied wes van die Hu -lyn. In 2015 was die verspreiding egter soos volg:

  • Wes van die lyn, 6 persent van die bevolking op 57 persent van die gebied (gemiddelde bevolkingsdigtheid: 39,6 inwoners per vierkante myl (15,3/km2).
  • Oos van die lyn, 94 persent van die bevolking op 43 persent van die gebied (gemiddelde bevolkingsdigtheid: 815,3 inwoners per vierkante myl (314,8/km2).

Aanhoudende tweespalt

Hu Huanyong se oorspronklike handgetekende kaart van China, met bevolkingsdigtheid en die nou bekende lyn (verbeter vir sigbaarheid).

Krediet: Chinese Journal of Geography (1935) - openbare domein.

Waarom is hierdie demografiese tweespalt so aanhoudend? In twee woorde: klimaat en terrein. Oos van die lyn is die land platter en natter, wat beteken dat dit makliker is om te boer, en dus makliker om genoeg voedsel vir 'n steeds groter bevolking te produseer. Wes van die lyn: woestyne, berge en plato's. Baie strenger terrein met 'n droër klimaat, wat dit baie moeiliker maak om groot hoeveelhede mense te onderhou.

En waar die mense is, volg die res. Oos van die lyn is feitlik die hele infrastruktuur en ekonomie van China. Saans sien satelliete die gebied in die ooste blink met lanternagtige stringe lig, terwyl die weste 'n kombers is van byna totale duisternis, wat soms afgebreek word deur tekens van lewe. In China se 'Wilde Weste' is die BBP per capita gemiddeld 15 persent laer as in die ywerige ooste.

'N Bykomende faktor kenmerk China se bevolkingsverskil: terwyl die land oor die algemeen etnies baie homogeen is - 92 persent is Han -Chinese - die meeste van die 8 persent wat die etniese minderhede van China uitmaak, woon wes van die lyn. Dit is veral die geval in Tibet en Xinjiang, twee nominaal outonome streke met nie-Han etniese meerderhede.

Hierdie kombinasie van ekonomiese en etniese wanbalanse beteken dat die Hu Line nie net 'n volgehoue ​​eienaardigheid is nie, maar 'n moontlike probleem - ten minste vanuit Beijing se perspektief. Kultureel en geografies ver van die ooste van die land, het Tibetane en Oeigoers sterk teenkanting teen die sentraliserende neigings van China aangeteken, wat dikwels tot onderdrukking gelei het.

Langtermyn strategie

Straataansig in Tengchong, op die grens van China met Myanmar.

Krediet: China Photos/Getty Images

Maar onderdrukking is nie die sentrale regering se langtermynstrategie nie. Die plan is om te kalmeer deur vordering. China se 'Manifest Destiny' het 'n naam. In 1999 het Jiang Zemin, destydse sekretaris-generaal van die Chinese Kommunistiese Party, die veldtog 'Ontwikkel die Weste' geloods. Die idee agter die slagspreuk behou sy politieke geldeenheid. In die afgelope dekade het die Chinese premier, Li Keqiang, die land herhaaldelik aangespoor om deur die Hu -lyn te "breek" om die westelike helfte van China te moderniseer.

Die ontwikkelingstrategie het 'n ekonomiese invalshoek-die toevoeging van nywerheid en infrastruktuur om die BBP per capita van die streek tot die gemiddelde van die land te verhoog. Maar die plaaslike bevolking is bang dat vooruitgang bevolkingsverandering sal meebring: 'n toestroming van genoeg interne migrante uit die ooste om die plaaslike etniese balans tot hul nadeel te bring.

Die etniese minderhede van China word amptelik erken en geniet sekere regte, maar as dit minderhede in hul eie streke word, beteken dit min meer as die reg om volksliedere en danse op te voer. Die Sowjets was voorheen meesters in hierdie tegniek.

Sal China dieselfde pad volg? Die vraag sal beantwoord word as en wanneer die Hu -lyn nie meer relevant is nie, hoeveel van die etniese diversiteit van die weste is opgeoffer vir ekonomiese vooruitgang.

Vreemde kaarte #1071


Die belangrikste grens van China is denkbeeldig: die Hu -lyn

Hu Line, wat in 1935 die eerste keer geteken is, illustreer die volgehoue ​​demografiese skeuring - hoe Beijing dit gaan hanteer, sal die land se toekoms bepaal.

Die westelike deel van China, meer as die helfte van sy grondgebied, besit slegs 6% van die bevolking. Die 'Hu Line' skei die land se wilde en leë weste van die baie meer bevolkte ooste.

  • In 1935 trek die demograaf Hu Huanyong 'n streep oor 'n kaart van China.
  • Die 'Hu Line' illustreer 'n merkwaardige skeiding in die bevolkingsverdeling van China.
  • Die kloof bly relevant, nie net vir die hede van China nie, maar ook vir die toekoms.

Gevolglike kenmerk

'N Bader in Blagoveshchensk, op die Russiese oewer van die Amoer. Oorkant die rivier: die Chinese stad Heihe.

Krediet: Dimitar Dilkoff/AFP via Getty Images

Die Hu -lyn is waarskynlik die belangrikste kenmerk van China se geografie, met demografiese, ekonomiese, kulturele en politieke implikasies vir die verlede, hede en toekoms van die land. Tog vind u dit nie op enige amptelike kaart van China nie, en ook nie op die werklike terrein van die Volksrepubliek self nie.

Daar is geen monumente op die eindpunte nie: nie in Heihe in die noorde nie, net 'n ysige swem oor die Amur van Blagoveshchensk, in die Verre Ooste van Rusland en ook nie in Tengchong nie, die subtropiese suidelike stad tussen die heuwels wat Myanmar inloop. Ook nie oral op die 2,330 myl (3,750 km) diagonaal wat albei kolletjies verbind nie. Die Hu Line is so onsigbaar as wat dit denkbeeldig is.

Maar die punt wat die Hu Line maak, is net so relevant soos toe dit eers voorgestel is. In 1935 gebruik 'n Chinese demograaf Hu Huanyong 'n handgetekende kaart van die lyn om sy artikel oor 'The Distribution of China's Population' in die Chinese Journal of Geography te illustreer.

Die punt van die artikel en van die kaart: die bevolking van China is oneweredig versprei, en nie net 'n bietjie nie, maar baie. Soos, baie.

  • Die gebied wes van die lyn beslaan 64 persent van China se gebied, maar bevat slegs 4 persent van die land se bevolking.
  • Omgekeerd het 96 persent van die Chinese op slegs 36 persent van die grond oos van die 'geo-demografiese afbakeningslyn', soos Hu dit genoem het, gewoon.

Baie het in die nabye eeu in China verander. Die swak post-keiserlike republiek is nou 'n hoogs gesentraliseerde wêreldmoondheid. Die bevolking het byna verdriedubbel, van ongeveer 500 miljoen tot byna 1,4 miljard. Maar die grondbeginsels van die wanbalans het feitlik dieselfde gebly.

Selfs al het China se gebied dit nie gedoen nie: in 1946 erken China die onafhanklikheid van Mongolië, en verminder die gebied wes van die Hu -lyn. In 2015 was die verspreiding egter soos volg:

  • Wes van die lyn, 6 persent van die bevolking op 57 persent van die gebied (gemiddelde bevolkingsdigtheid: 39,6 inwoners per vierkante myl (15,3/km2).
  • Oos van die lyn, 94 persent van die bevolking op 43 persent van die gebied (gemiddelde bevolkingsdigtheid: 815,3 inwoners per vierkante myl (314,8/km2).

Aanhoudende tweespalt

Hu Huanyong se oorspronklike handgetekende kaart van China, met bevolkingsdigtheid en die nou bekende lyn (verbeter vir sigbaarheid).

Krediet: Chinese Journal of Geography (1935) - openbare domein.

Waarom is hierdie demografiese tweespalt so aanhoudend? In twee woorde: klimaat en terrein. Oos van die lyn is die land platter en natter, wat beteken dat dit makliker is om te boer, en dus makliker om genoeg voedsel vir 'n steeds groter bevolking te produseer. Wes van die lyn: woestyne, berge en plato's. Baie strenger terrein met 'n droër klimaat, wat dit baie moeiliker maak om groot hoeveelhede mense te onderhou.

En waar die mense is, volg die res. Oos van die lyn is feitlik die hele infrastruktuur en ekonomie van China. Saans sien satelliete die gebied in die ooste blink met lanternagtige stringe lig, terwyl die weste 'n kombers van byna totale duisternis is, wat soms afgebreek word deur tekens van lewe. In China se 'Wilde Weste' is die BBP per capita gemiddeld 15 persent laer as in die ywerige ooste.

'N Bykomende faktor kenmerk China se bevolkingsverskil: terwyl die land oor die algemeen etnies baie homogeen is - 92 persent is Han -Chinese - die meeste van die 8 persent wat die etniese minderhede van China uitmaak, woon wes van die lyn. Dit is veral die geval in Tibet en Xinjiang, twee nominaal outonome streke met nie-Han etniese meerderhede.

Hierdie kombinasie van ekonomiese en etniese wanbalanse beteken dat die Hu Line nie net 'n volgehoue ​​eienaardigheid is nie, maar 'n moontlike probleem - ten minste vanuit Beijing se perspektief. Kultureel en geografies ver van die ooste van die land het Tibetane en Oeigoers sterk teenkanting teen die sentraliserende neigings van China aangeteken, wat dikwels onderdrukking van harte tot gevolg gehad het.

Langtermyn strategie

Straataansig in Tengchong, op die grens van China met Myanmar.

Krediet: China Photos/Getty Images

Maar onderdrukking is nie die sentrale regering se langtermynstrategie nie. Die plan is om te kalmeer deur vordering. China se 'Manifest Destiny' het 'n naam. In 1999 het Jiang Zemin, destydse sekretaris-generaal van die Chinese Kommunistiese Party, die veldtog 'Ontwikkel die Weste' geloods. Die idee agter die slagspreuk behou sy politieke geldeenheid. In die afgelope dekade het die Chinese premier, Li Keqiang, die land herhaaldelik aangespoor om die Hu -lyn te "deurbreek" om die westelike helfte van China te moderniseer.

Die ontwikkelingstrategie het 'n ekonomiese invalshoek-die toevoeging van nywerheid en infrastruktuur om die BBP per capita van die streek tot die gemiddelde van die land te verhoog. Maar die plaaslike bevolking is bang dat vooruitgang bevolkingsverandering sal meebring: 'n toestroming van genoeg interne migrante uit die ooste om die plaaslike etniese balans tot hul nadeel te bring.

Die etniese minderhede van China word amptelik erken en geniet sekere regte, maar as dit minderhede in hul eie streke word, beteken dit min meer as die reg om volksliedere en danse op te voer. Die Sowjets was voorheen meesters in hierdie tegniek.

Sal China dieselfde pad volg? Die vraag sal beantwoord word as en wanneer die Hu -lyn nie meer relevant is nie, hoeveel van die etniese diversiteit van die weste is opgeoffer vir ekonomiese vooruitgang.

Vreemde kaarte #1071


Die belangrikste grens van China is denkbeeldig: die Hu -lyn

Hu Line, wat in 1935 die eerste keer geteken is, illustreer die volgehoue ​​demografiese skeuring - hoe Beijing dit gaan hanteer, sal die land se toekoms bepaal.

Die westelike deel van China, meer as die helfte van sy grondgebied, beslaan slegs 6% van die bevolking. Die 'Hu Line' skei die land se wilde en leë weste van die baie meer bevolkte ooste.

  • In 1935 trek die demograaf Hu Huanyong 'n streep oor 'n kaart van China.
  • Die 'Hu Line' illustreer 'n merkwaardige skeiding in die bevolkingsverdeling van China.
  • Die kloof bly relevant, nie net vir die hede van China nie, maar ook vir die toekoms.

Gevolglike kenmerk

'N Bader in Blagoveshchensk, op die Russiese oewer van die Amoer. Oorkant die rivier: die Chinese stad Heihe.

Krediet: Dimitar Dilkoff/AFP via Getty Images

Die Hu -lyn is waarskynlik die belangrikste kenmerk van China se geografie, met demografiese, ekonomiese, kulturele en politieke implikasies vir die verlede, hede en toekoms van die land. Tog vind u dit nie op enige amptelike kaart van China nie, en ook nie op die werklike terrein van die Volksrepubliek self nie.

Daar is geen monumente op die eindpunte nie: nie in Heihe in die noorde nie, net 'n ysige swem oor die Amur vanaf Blagoveshchensk, in die Verre Ooste van Rusland en ook nie in Tengchong nie, die subtropiese suidelike stad tussen die heuwels wat in Myanmar rol. Ook nie oral op die 2,330 myl (3,750 km) diagonaal wat albei kolletjies verbind nie. Die Hu Line is so onsigbaar as wat dit denkbeeldig is.

Die punt wat die Hu Line maak, is egter net so relevant soos toe dit eers voorgestel is. In 1935 gebruik 'n Chinese demograaf Hu Huanyong 'n handgetekende kaart van die lyn om sy artikel oor 'The Distribution of China's Population' in die Chinese Journal of Geography te illustreer.

Die punt van die artikel en van die kaart: die bevolking van China is oneweredig versprei, en nie net 'n bietjie nie, maar baie. Soos, baie.

  • Die gebied wes van die lyn beslaan 64 persent van China se gebied, maar bevat slegs 4 persent van die land se bevolking.
  • Omgekeerd het 96 persent van die Chinese op slegs 36 persent van die grond oos van die 'geo-demografiese afbakeningslyn', soos Hu dit genoem het, gewoon.

Baie het in die nabye eeu in China verander. Die swak post-keiserlike republiek is nou 'n hoogs gesentraliseerde wêreldmoondheid. Die bevolking het byna verdriedubbel, van ongeveer 500 miljoen tot byna 1,4 miljard. Maar die grondbeginsels van die wanbalans het feitlik dieselfde gebly.

Selfs al het China se gebied dit nie gedoen nie: in 1946 erken China die onafhanklikheid van Mongolië, wat die gebied wes van die Hu -lyn krimp. In 2015 was die verspreiding egter soos volg:

  • Wes van die lyn, 6 persent van die bevolking op 57 persent van die gebied (gemiddelde bevolkingsdigtheid: 39,6 inwoners per vierkante myl (15,3/km2).
  • Oos van die lyn, 94 persent van die bevolking op 43 persent van die gebied (gemiddelde bevolkingsdigtheid: 815,3 inwoners per vierkante myl (314,8/km2).

Aanhoudende tweespalt

Hu Huanyong se oorspronklike handgetekende kaart van China, met bevolkingsdigtheid en die nou bekende lyn (verbeter vir sigbaarheid).

Krediet: Chinese Journal of Geography (1935) - publieke domein.

Waarom is hierdie demografiese tweespalt so aanhoudend? In twee woorde: klimaat en terrein. Oos van die lyn is die land platter en natter, wat beteken dat dit makliker is om te boer, en dus makliker om genoeg voedsel vir 'n steeds groter bevolking te produseer. Wes van die lyn: woestyne, berge en plato's. Baie strenger terrein met 'n droër klimaat, wat dit baie moeiliker maak om groot hoeveelhede mense te onderhou.

En waar die mense is, volg die res. Oos van die lyn is feitlik die hele infrastruktuur en ekonomie van China. Saans sien satelliete die gebied in die ooste blink met lanternagtige stringe lig, terwyl die weste 'n kombers van byna totale duisternis is, wat soms afgebreek word deur tekens van lewe. In China se 'Wilde Weste' is die BBP per capita gemiddeld 15 persent laer as in die ywerige ooste.

'N Bykomende faktor kenmerk China se bevolkingsverskil: terwyl die land oor die algemeen etnies baie homogeen is - 92 persent is Han -Chinese - die meeste van die 8 persent wat die etniese minderhede van China uitmaak, woon wes van die lyn. Dit is veral die geval in Tibet en Xinjiang, twee nominaal outonome streke met nie-Han etniese meerderhede.

Hierdie kombinasie van ekonomiese en etniese wanbalanse beteken dat die Hu Line nie net 'n volgehoue ​​eienaardigheid is nie, maar 'n moontlike probleem - ten minste vanuit Beijing se perspektief. Kultureel en geografies ver van die ooste van die land, het Tibetane en Oeigoers sterk teenkanting teen die sentraliserende neigings van China aangeteken, wat dikwels tot onderdrukking gelei het.

Langtermyn strategie

Straataansig in Tengchong, op die grens van China met Myanmar.

Krediet: China Photos/Getty Images

Maar onderdrukking is nie die sentrale regering se langtermynstrategie nie. Die plan is om te kalmeer deur vordering. China se 'Manifest Destiny' het 'n naam. In 1999 het Jiang Zemin, destydse sekretaris-generaal van die Chinese Kommunistiese Party, die veldtog 'Ontwikkel die Weste' geloods. Die idee agter die slagspreuk behou sy politieke geldeenheid. In die afgelope dekade het die Chinese premier, Li Keqiang, die land herhaaldelik aangespoor om deur die Hu -lyn te "breek" om die westelike helfte van China te moderniseer.

Die ontwikkelingstrategie het 'n ekonomiese invalshoek-die toevoeging van nywerheid en infrastruktuur om die BBP per capita van die streek tot die gemiddelde van die land te verhoog. Maar die plaaslike bevolking is bang dat vooruitgang bevolkingsverandering sal meebring: 'n toestroming van genoeg interne migrante uit die ooste om die plaaslike etniese balans tot hul nadeel te bring.

Die etniese minderhede van China word amptelik erken en geniet sekere regte, maar as dit minderhede in hul eie streke word, beteken dit min meer as die reg om volksliedere en danse op te voer. Die Sowjets was voorheen meesters in hierdie tegniek.

Sal China dieselfde pad volg? Die vraag sal beantwoord word as en wanneer die Hu -lyn nie meer relevant is nie, hoeveel van die etniese diversiteit van die weste is opgeoffer vir ekonomiese vooruitgang.

Vreemde kaarte #1071


Die belangrikste grens van China is denkbeeldig: die Hu -lyn

Hu Line, wat in 1935 die eerste keer geteken is, illustreer die volgehoue ​​demografiese skeuring - hoe Beijing dit gaan hanteer, sal die land se toekoms bepaal.

Die westelike deel van China, meer as die helfte van sy grondgebied, beslaan slegs 6% van die bevolking. Die 'Hu Line' skei die land se wilde en leë weste van die baie meer bevolkte ooste.

  • In 1935 trek die demograaf Hu Huanyong 'n streep oor 'n kaart van China.
  • Die 'Hu Line' illustreer 'n merkwaardige skeiding in die bevolkingsverdeling van China.
  • Die kloof bly relevant, nie net vir die hede van China nie, maar ook vir die toekoms.

Gevolglike kenmerk

'N Bader in Blagoveshchensk, op die Russiese oewer van die Amoer. Oorkant die rivier: die Chinese stad Heihe.

Krediet: Dimitar Dilkoff/AFP via Getty Images

Die Hu -lyn is waarskynlik die belangrikste kenmerk van China se geografie, met demografiese, ekonomiese, kulturele en politieke implikasies vir die verlede, hede en toekoms van die land. Tog vind u dit nie op enige amptelike kaart van China nie, en ook nie op die werklike terrein van die Volksrepubliek self nie.

Daar is geen monumente op die eindpunte nie: nie in Heihe in die noorde nie, net 'n ysige swem oor die Amur van Blagoveshchensk, in die Verre Ooste van Rusland en ook nie in Tengchong nie, die subtropiese suidelike stad tussen die heuwels wat Myanmar inloop. Ook nie oral op die 2,330 myl (3,750 km) diagonaal wat albei kolletjies verbind nie. Die Hu Line is so onsigbaar as wat dit denkbeeldig is.

Maar die punt wat die Hu Line maak, is net so relevant soos toe dit eers voorgestel is. In 1935 gebruik 'n Chinese demograaf Hu Huanyong 'n handgetekende kaart van die lyn om sy artikel oor 'The Distribution of China's Population' in die Chinese Journal of Geography te illustreer.

Die punt van die artikel en van die kaart: die bevolking van China is oneweredig versprei, en nie net 'n bietjie nie, maar baie. Soos, baie.

  • Die gebied wes van die lyn beslaan 64 persent van China se gebied, maar bevat slegs 4 persent van die land se bevolking.
  • Omgekeerd het 96 persent van die Chinese op slegs 36 persent van die grond oos van die 'geo-demografiese afbakeningslyn', soos Hu dit genoem het, gewoon.

Baie het in die nabye eeu in China verander. Die swak post-keiserlike republiek is nou 'n hoogs gesentraliseerde wêreldmoondheid. Die bevolking het byna verdriedubbel, van ongeveer 500 miljoen tot byna 1,4 miljard. Maar die grondbeginsels van die wanbalans het feitlik dieselfde gebly.

Selfs al het China se gebied dit nie gedoen nie: in 1946 erken China die onafhanklikheid van Mongolië, en verminder die gebied wes van die Hu -lyn. In 2015 was die verspreiding egter soos volg:

  • Wes van die lyn, 6 persent van die bevolking op 57 persent van die gebied (gemiddelde bevolkingsdigtheid: 39,6 inwoners per vierkante myl (15,3/km2).
  • Oos van die lyn, 94 persent van die bevolking op 43 persent van die gebied (gemiddelde bevolkingsdigtheid: 815,3 inwoners per vierkante myl (314,8/km2).

Aanhoudende tweespalt

Hu Huanyong se oorspronklike handgetekende kaart van China, met bevolkingsdigtheid en die nou bekende lyn (verbeter vir sigbaarheid).

Krediet: Chinese Journal of Geography (1935) - publieke domein.

Waarom is hierdie demografiese tweespalt so aanhoudend? In twee woorde: klimaat en terrein. Oos van die lyn is die land platter en natter, wat beteken dat dit makliker is om te boer, en dus makliker om genoeg voedsel vir 'n steeds groter bevolking te produseer. Wes van die lyn: woestyne, berge en plato's. Baie strenger terrein met 'n droër klimaat, wat dit baie moeiliker maak om groot hoeveelhede mense te onderhou.

En waar die mense is, volg die res. Oos van die lyn is feitlik die hele infrastruktuur en ekonomie van China. Saans sien satelliete die gebied in die ooste blink met lanternagtige stringe lig, terwyl die weste 'n kombers is van byna totale duisternis, wat soms afgebreek word deur tekens van lewe. In China se 'Wilde Weste' is die BBP per capita gemiddeld 15 persent laer as in die ywerige ooste.

'N Bykomende faktor kenmerk China se bevolkingsverskil: terwyl die land oor die algemeen etnies baie homogeen is - 92 persent is Han -Chinese - die meeste van die 8 persent wat die etniese minderhede van China uitmaak, woon wes van die lyn. Dit is veral die geval in Tibet en Xinjiang, twee nominaal outonome streke met nie-Han etniese meerderhede.

Hierdie kombinasie van ekonomiese en etniese wanbalanse beteken dat die Hu Line nie net 'n volgehoue ​​eienaardigheid is nie, maar 'n moontlike probleem - ten minste vanuit Beijing se perspektief. Kultureel en geografies ver van die ooste van die land het Tibetane en Oeigoers sterk teenkanting teen die sentraliserende neigings van China aangeteken, wat dikwels onderdrukking van harte tot gevolg gehad het.

Langtermyn strategie

Straataansig in Tengchong, op die grens van China met Myanmar.

Krediet: China Photos/Getty Images

Maar onderdrukking is nie die sentrale regering se langtermynstrategie nie. Die plan is om te kalmeer deur vordering. China se 'Manifest Destiny' het 'n naam. In 1999 het Jiang Zemin, destydse sekretaris-generaal van die Chinese Kommunistiese Party, die veldtog 'Ontwikkel die Weste' geloods. Die idee agter die slagspreuk behou sy politieke geldeenheid. In die afgelope dekade het die Chinese premier, Li Keqiang, die land herhaaldelik aangespoor om deur die Hu -lyn te "breek" om die westelike helfte van China te moderniseer.

Die ontwikkelingstrategie het 'n ekonomiese invalshoek-die toevoeging van nywerheid en infrastruktuur om die BBP per capita van die streek tot die gemiddelde van die land te verhoog. Maar die plaaslike bevolking is bang dat vooruitgang bevolkingsverandering sal meebring: 'n toestroming van genoeg interne migrante uit die ooste om die plaaslike etniese balans tot hul nadeel te bring.

Die etniese minderhede van China word amptelik erken en geniet sekere regte, maar as dit minderhede in hul eie streke word, beteken dit min meer as die reg om volksliedere en danse op te voer. Die Sowjets was voorheen meesters in hierdie tegniek.

Sal China dieselfde pad volg? That question will be answered if and when the Hu Line fades from relevance, by how much of the west's ethnic diversity will have been sacrificed for economic progress.

Strange Maps #1071


China’s most important border is imaginary: the Hu Line

First drawn in 1935, Hu Line illustrates persistent demographic split – how Beijing deals with it will determine the country's future.

The western part of China, more than half its territory, holds only 6% of its population. The 'Hu Line' separates the country's wild and empty west from the vastly more populous east.

  • In 1935, demographer Hu Huanyong drew a line across a map of China.
  • The 'Hu Line' illustrated a remarkable divide in China's population distribution.
  • That divide remains relevant, not just for China's present but also for its future.

Consequential feature

A bather in Blagoveshchensk, on the Russian bank of the Amur. Across the river: the Chinese city of Heihe.

Credit: Dimitar Dilkoff/AFP via Getty Images

The Hu Line is arguably the most consequential feature of China's geography, with demographic, economic, cultural, and political implications for the country's past, present, and future. Yet you won't find it on any official map of China, nor on the actual terrain of the People's Republic itself.

There are no monuments at its endpoints: not in Heihe in the north, just an icy swim across the Amur from Blagoveshchensk, in Russia's Far East nor in Tengchong, the subtropical southern city set among the hills rolling into Myanmar. Nor indeed anywhere on the 2,330-mile (3,750-km) diagonal that connects both dots. The Hu Line is as invisible as it is imaginary.

Yet the point that the Hu Line makes is as relevant as when it was first imagined. Back in 1935, a Chinese demographer called Hu Huanyong used a hand-drawn map of the line to illustrate his article on 'The Distribution of China's Population' in the Chinese Journal of Geography.

The point of the article, and of the map: China's population is distributed unevenly, and not just a little, but a lot. Soos, baie.

  • The area to the west of the line comprised 64 percent of China's territory but contained only 4 percent of the country's population.
  • Inversely, 96 percent of the Chinese lived east of the 'geo-demographic demarcation line', as Hu called it, on just 36 percent of the land.

Much has changed in China in the intervening near-century. The weak post-imperial republic is now a highly centralized world power. Its population has nearly tripled, from around 500 million to almost 1.4 billion. But the fundamentals of the imbalance have remained virtually the same.

Even if China's territory has not: in 1946, China recognized the independence of Mongolia, shrinking the area west of the Hu Line. Still, in 2015, the distribution was as follows:

  • West of the line, 6 percent of the population on 57 percent of the territory (average population density: 39.6 inhabitants per square mile (15.3/km2).
  • East of the line, 94 percent of the population on 43 percent of the territory (average population density: 815.3 inhabitants per square mile (314.8/km2).

Persistent dichotomy

Hu Huanyong's original hand-drawn map of China, showing population density and the now-famous line (enhanced for visibility).

Credit: Chinese Journal of Geography (1935) – public domain.

Why is this demographic dichotomy so persistent? In two words: climate and terrain. East of the line, the land is flatter and wetter, meaning it's easier to farm, hence easier to produce enough food for an ever-larger population. West of the line: deserts, mountains, and plateaus. Much harsher terrain with a drier climate to boot, making it much harder to sustain large amounts of people.

And where the people are, all the rest follows. East of the line is virtually all of China's infrastructure and economy. At night, satellites see the area to the east twinkle with lantern-like strings of light, while the west is a blanket of near total darkness, only occasionally pierced by signs of life. In China's 'Wild West', per-capita GDP is 15 percent lower on average than in the industrious east.

An additional factor typifies China's population divide: while the country overall is ethnically very homogenous – 92 percent are Han Chinese – most of the 8 percent that make up China's ethnic minorities live west of the line. This is notably the case in Tibet and Xinjiang, two nominally autonomous regions with non-Han ethnic majorities.

This combination of economic and ethnic imbalances means the Hu Line is not just a persistent quirk, but a potential problem – at least from Beijing's perspective. Culturally and geographically distant from the country's east, Tibetans and Uyghurs have registered strong opposition to China's centralizing tendencies, often resulting in heavy-handed repression.

Long-term strategy

Street view in Tengchong, on China's border with Myanmar.

Credit: China Photos/Getty Images

But repression is not the central government's long-term strategy. Its plan is to pacify by progress. China's 'Manifest Destiny' has a name. In 1999, Jiang Zemin, then Secretary-General of the Chinese Communist Party, launched the 'Develop the West' campaign. The idea behind the slogan retains its political currency. In the last decade, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang has repeatedly urged the country to "break through" the Hu Line, in order to modernize China's western half.

The development strategy has an economic angle – adding industry and infrastructure to raise the region's per-capita GDP to the nation's average. But the locals fear that progress will bring population change: an influx of enough internal migrants from the east to tip the local ethnic balance to their disadvantage.

China's ethnic minorities are officially recognized and enjoy certain rights however, if they become minorities in their own regions, those will mean little more than the right to perform folklore songs and dances. The Soviets were past masters in this technique.

Will China follow the same path? That question will be answered if and when the Hu Line fades from relevance, by how much of the west's ethnic diversity will have been sacrificed for economic progress.

Strange Maps #1071


China’s most important border is imaginary: the Hu Line

First drawn in 1935, Hu Line illustrates persistent demographic split – how Beijing deals with it will determine the country's future.

The western part of China, more than half its territory, holds only 6% of its population. The 'Hu Line' separates the country's wild and empty west from the vastly more populous east.

  • In 1935, demographer Hu Huanyong drew a line across a map of China.
  • The 'Hu Line' illustrated a remarkable divide in China's population distribution.
  • That divide remains relevant, not just for China's present but also for its future.

Consequential feature

A bather in Blagoveshchensk, on the Russian bank of the Amur. Across the river: the Chinese city of Heihe.

Credit: Dimitar Dilkoff/AFP via Getty Images

The Hu Line is arguably the most consequential feature of China's geography, with demographic, economic, cultural, and political implications for the country's past, present, and future. Yet you won't find it on any official map of China, nor on the actual terrain of the People's Republic itself.

There are no monuments at its endpoints: not in Heihe in the north, just an icy swim across the Amur from Blagoveshchensk, in Russia's Far East nor in Tengchong, the subtropical southern city set among the hills rolling into Myanmar. Nor indeed anywhere on the 2,330-mile (3,750-km) diagonal that connects both dots. The Hu Line is as invisible as it is imaginary.

Yet the point that the Hu Line makes is as relevant as when it was first imagined. Back in 1935, a Chinese demographer called Hu Huanyong used a hand-drawn map of the line to illustrate his article on 'The Distribution of China's Population' in the Chinese Journal of Geography.

The point of the article, and of the map: China's population is distributed unevenly, and not just a little, but a lot. Soos, baie.

  • The area to the west of the line comprised 64 percent of China's territory but contained only 4 percent of the country's population.
  • Inversely, 96 percent of the Chinese lived east of the 'geo-demographic demarcation line', as Hu called it, on just 36 percent of the land.

Much has changed in China in the intervening near-century. The weak post-imperial republic is now a highly centralized world power. Its population has nearly tripled, from around 500 million to almost 1.4 billion. But the fundamentals of the imbalance have remained virtually the same.

Even if China's territory has not: in 1946, China recognized the independence of Mongolia, shrinking the area west of the Hu Line. Still, in 2015, the distribution was as follows:

  • West of the line, 6 percent of the population on 57 percent of the territory (average population density: 39.6 inhabitants per square mile (15.3/km2).
  • East of the line, 94 percent of the population on 43 percent of the territory (average population density: 815.3 inhabitants per square mile (314.8/km2).

Persistent dichotomy

Hu Huanyong's original hand-drawn map of China, showing population density and the now-famous line (enhanced for visibility).

Credit: Chinese Journal of Geography (1935) – public domain.

Why is this demographic dichotomy so persistent? In two words: climate and terrain. East of the line, the land is flatter and wetter, meaning it's easier to farm, hence easier to produce enough food for an ever-larger population. West of the line: deserts, mountains, and plateaus. Much harsher terrain with a drier climate to boot, making it much harder to sustain large amounts of people.

And where the people are, all the rest follows. East of the line is virtually all of China's infrastructure and economy. At night, satellites see the area to the east twinkle with lantern-like strings of light, while the west is a blanket of near total darkness, only occasionally pierced by signs of life. In China's 'Wild West', per-capita GDP is 15 percent lower on average than in the industrious east.

An additional factor typifies China's population divide: while the country overall is ethnically very homogenous – 92 percent are Han Chinese – most of the 8 percent that make up China's ethnic minorities live west of the line. This is notably the case in Tibet and Xinjiang, two nominally autonomous regions with non-Han ethnic majorities.

This combination of economic and ethnic imbalances means the Hu Line is not just a persistent quirk, but a potential problem – at least from Beijing's perspective. Culturally and geographically distant from the country's east, Tibetans and Uyghurs have registered strong opposition to China's centralizing tendencies, often resulting in heavy-handed repression.

Long-term strategy

Street view in Tengchong, on China's border with Myanmar.

Credit: China Photos/Getty Images

But repression is not the central government's long-term strategy. Its plan is to pacify by progress. China's 'Manifest Destiny' has a name. In 1999, Jiang Zemin, then Secretary-General of the Chinese Communist Party, launched the 'Develop the West' campaign. The idea behind the slogan retains its political currency. In the last decade, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang has repeatedly urged the country to "break through" the Hu Line, in order to modernize China's western half.

The development strategy has an economic angle – adding industry and infrastructure to raise the region's per-capita GDP to the nation's average. But the locals fear that progress will bring population change: an influx of enough internal migrants from the east to tip the local ethnic balance to their disadvantage.

China's ethnic minorities are officially recognized and enjoy certain rights however, if they become minorities in their own regions, those will mean little more than the right to perform folklore songs and dances. The Soviets were past masters in this technique.

Will China follow the same path? That question will be answered if and when the Hu Line fades from relevance, by how much of the west's ethnic diversity will have been sacrificed for economic progress.

Strange Maps #1071


China’s most important border is imaginary: the Hu Line

First drawn in 1935, Hu Line illustrates persistent demographic split – how Beijing deals with it will determine the country's future.

The western part of China, more than half its territory, holds only 6% of its population. The 'Hu Line' separates the country's wild and empty west from the vastly more populous east.

  • In 1935, demographer Hu Huanyong drew a line across a map of China.
  • The 'Hu Line' illustrated a remarkable divide in China's population distribution.
  • That divide remains relevant, not just for China's present but also for its future.

Consequential feature

A bather in Blagoveshchensk, on the Russian bank of the Amur. Across the river: the Chinese city of Heihe.

Credit: Dimitar Dilkoff/AFP via Getty Images

The Hu Line is arguably the most consequential feature of China's geography, with demographic, economic, cultural, and political implications for the country's past, present, and future. Yet you won't find it on any official map of China, nor on the actual terrain of the People's Republic itself.

There are no monuments at its endpoints: not in Heihe in the north, just an icy swim across the Amur from Blagoveshchensk, in Russia's Far East nor in Tengchong, the subtropical southern city set among the hills rolling into Myanmar. Nor indeed anywhere on the 2,330-mile (3,750-km) diagonal that connects both dots. The Hu Line is as invisible as it is imaginary.

Yet the point that the Hu Line makes is as relevant as when it was first imagined. Back in 1935, a Chinese demographer called Hu Huanyong used a hand-drawn map of the line to illustrate his article on 'The Distribution of China's Population' in the Chinese Journal of Geography.

The point of the article, and of the map: China's population is distributed unevenly, and not just a little, but a lot. Soos, baie.

  • The area to the west of the line comprised 64 percent of China's territory but contained only 4 percent of the country's population.
  • Inversely, 96 percent of the Chinese lived east of the 'geo-demographic demarcation line', as Hu called it, on just 36 percent of the land.

Much has changed in China in the intervening near-century. The weak post-imperial republic is now a highly centralized world power. Its population has nearly tripled, from around 500 million to almost 1.4 billion. But the fundamentals of the imbalance have remained virtually the same.

Even if China's territory has not: in 1946, China recognized the independence of Mongolia, shrinking the area west of the Hu Line. Still, in 2015, the distribution was as follows:

  • West of the line, 6 percent of the population on 57 percent of the territory (average population density: 39.6 inhabitants per square mile (15.3/km2).
  • East of the line, 94 percent of the population on 43 percent of the territory (average population density: 815.3 inhabitants per square mile (314.8/km2).

Persistent dichotomy

Hu Huanyong's original hand-drawn map of China, showing population density and the now-famous line (enhanced for visibility).

Credit: Chinese Journal of Geography (1935) – public domain.

Why is this demographic dichotomy so persistent? In two words: climate and terrain. East of the line, the land is flatter and wetter, meaning it's easier to farm, hence easier to produce enough food for an ever-larger population. West of the line: deserts, mountains, and plateaus. Much harsher terrain with a drier climate to boot, making it much harder to sustain large amounts of people.

And where the people are, all the rest follows. East of the line is virtually all of China's infrastructure and economy. At night, satellites see the area to the east twinkle with lantern-like strings of light, while the west is a blanket of near total darkness, only occasionally pierced by signs of life. In China's 'Wild West', per-capita GDP is 15 percent lower on average than in the industrious east.

An additional factor typifies China's population divide: while the country overall is ethnically very homogenous – 92 percent are Han Chinese – most of the 8 percent that make up China's ethnic minorities live west of the line. This is notably the case in Tibet and Xinjiang, two nominally autonomous regions with non-Han ethnic majorities.

This combination of economic and ethnic imbalances means the Hu Line is not just a persistent quirk, but a potential problem – at least from Beijing's perspective. Culturally and geographically distant from the country's east, Tibetans and Uyghurs have registered strong opposition to China's centralizing tendencies, often resulting in heavy-handed repression.

Long-term strategy

Street view in Tengchong, on China's border with Myanmar.

Credit: China Photos/Getty Images

But repression is not the central government's long-term strategy. Its plan is to pacify by progress. China's 'Manifest Destiny' has a name. In 1999, Jiang Zemin, then Secretary-General of the Chinese Communist Party, launched the 'Develop the West' campaign. The idea behind the slogan retains its political currency. In the last decade, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang has repeatedly urged the country to "break through" the Hu Line, in order to modernize China's western half.

The development strategy has an economic angle – adding industry and infrastructure to raise the region's per-capita GDP to the nation's average. But the locals fear that progress will bring population change: an influx of enough internal migrants from the east to tip the local ethnic balance to their disadvantage.

China's ethnic minorities are officially recognized and enjoy certain rights however, if they become minorities in their own regions, those will mean little more than the right to perform folklore songs and dances. The Soviets were past masters in this technique.

Will China follow the same path? That question will be answered if and when the Hu Line fades from relevance, by how much of the west's ethnic diversity will have been sacrificed for economic progress.

Strange Maps #1071


China’s most important border is imaginary: the Hu Line

First drawn in 1935, Hu Line illustrates persistent demographic split – how Beijing deals with it will determine the country's future.

The western part of China, more than half its territory, holds only 6% of its population. The 'Hu Line' separates the country's wild and empty west from the vastly more populous east.

  • In 1935, demographer Hu Huanyong drew a line across a map of China.
  • The 'Hu Line' illustrated a remarkable divide in China's population distribution.
  • That divide remains relevant, not just for China's present but also for its future.

Consequential feature

A bather in Blagoveshchensk, on the Russian bank of the Amur. Across the river: the Chinese city of Heihe.

Credit: Dimitar Dilkoff/AFP via Getty Images

The Hu Line is arguably the most consequential feature of China's geography, with demographic, economic, cultural, and political implications for the country's past, present, and future. Yet you won't find it on any official map of China, nor on the actual terrain of the People's Republic itself.

There are no monuments at its endpoints: not in Heihe in the north, just an icy swim across the Amur from Blagoveshchensk, in Russia's Far East nor in Tengchong, the subtropical southern city set among the hills rolling into Myanmar. Nor indeed anywhere on the 2,330-mile (3,750-km) diagonal that connects both dots. The Hu Line is as invisible as it is imaginary.

Yet the point that the Hu Line makes is as relevant as when it was first imagined. Back in 1935, a Chinese demographer called Hu Huanyong used a hand-drawn map of the line to illustrate his article on 'The Distribution of China's Population' in the Chinese Journal of Geography.

The point of the article, and of the map: China's population is distributed unevenly, and not just a little, but a lot. Soos, baie.

  • The area to the west of the line comprised 64 percent of China's territory but contained only 4 percent of the country's population.
  • Inversely, 96 percent of the Chinese lived east of the 'geo-demographic demarcation line', as Hu called it, on just 36 percent of the land.

Much has changed in China in the intervening near-century. The weak post-imperial republic is now a highly centralized world power. Its population has nearly tripled, from around 500 million to almost 1.4 billion. But the fundamentals of the imbalance have remained virtually the same.

Even if China's territory has not: in 1946, China recognized the independence of Mongolia, shrinking the area west of the Hu Line. Still, in 2015, the distribution was as follows:

  • West of the line, 6 percent of the population on 57 percent of the territory (average population density: 39.6 inhabitants per square mile (15.3/km2).
  • East of the line, 94 percent of the population on 43 percent of the territory (average population density: 815.3 inhabitants per square mile (314.8/km2).

Persistent dichotomy

Hu Huanyong's original hand-drawn map of China, showing population density and the now-famous line (enhanced for visibility).

Credit: Chinese Journal of Geography (1935) – public domain.

Why is this demographic dichotomy so persistent? In two words: climate and terrain. East of the line, the land is flatter and wetter, meaning it's easier to farm, hence easier to produce enough food for an ever-larger population. West of the line: deserts, mountains, and plateaus. Much harsher terrain with a drier climate to boot, making it much harder to sustain large amounts of people.

And where the people are, all the rest follows. East of the line is virtually all of China's infrastructure and economy. At night, satellites see the area to the east twinkle with lantern-like strings of light, while the west is a blanket of near total darkness, only occasionally pierced by signs of life. In China's 'Wild West', per-capita GDP is 15 percent lower on average than in the industrious east.

An additional factor typifies China's population divide: while the country overall is ethnically very homogenous – 92 percent are Han Chinese – most of the 8 percent that make up China's ethnic minorities live west of the line. This is notably the case in Tibet and Xinjiang, two nominally autonomous regions with non-Han ethnic majorities.

This combination of economic and ethnic imbalances means the Hu Line is not just a persistent quirk, but a potential problem – at least from Beijing's perspective. Culturally and geographically distant from the country's east, Tibetans and Uyghurs have registered strong opposition to China's centralizing tendencies, often resulting in heavy-handed repression.

Long-term strategy

Street view in Tengchong, on China's border with Myanmar.

Credit: China Photos/Getty Images

But repression is not the central government's long-term strategy. Its plan is to pacify by progress. China's 'Manifest Destiny' has a name. In 1999, Jiang Zemin, then Secretary-General of the Chinese Communist Party, launched the 'Develop the West' campaign. The idea behind the slogan retains its political currency. In the last decade, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang has repeatedly urged the country to "break through" the Hu Line, in order to modernize China's western half.

The development strategy has an economic angle – adding industry and infrastructure to raise the region's per-capita GDP to the nation's average. But the locals fear that progress will bring population change: an influx of enough internal migrants from the east to tip the local ethnic balance to their disadvantage.

China's ethnic minorities are officially recognized and enjoy certain rights however, if they become minorities in their own regions, those will mean little more than the right to perform folklore songs and dances. The Soviets were past masters in this technique.

Will China follow the same path? That question will be answered if and when the Hu Line fades from relevance, by how much of the west's ethnic diversity will have been sacrificed for economic progress.

Strange Maps #1071


China’s most important border is imaginary: the Hu Line

First drawn in 1935, Hu Line illustrates persistent demographic split – how Beijing deals with it will determine the country's future.

The western part of China, more than half its territory, holds only 6% of its population. The 'Hu Line' separates the country's wild and empty west from the vastly more populous east.

  • In 1935, demographer Hu Huanyong drew a line across a map of China.
  • The 'Hu Line' illustrated a remarkable divide in China's population distribution.
  • That divide remains relevant, not just for China's present but also for its future.

Consequential feature

A bather in Blagoveshchensk, on the Russian bank of the Amur. Across the river: the Chinese city of Heihe.

Credit: Dimitar Dilkoff/AFP via Getty Images

The Hu Line is arguably the most consequential feature of China's geography, with demographic, economic, cultural, and political implications for the country's past, present, and future. Yet you won't find it on any official map of China, nor on the actual terrain of the People's Republic itself.

There are no monuments at its endpoints: not in Heihe in the north, just an icy swim across the Amur from Blagoveshchensk, in Russia's Far East nor in Tengchong, the subtropical southern city set among the hills rolling into Myanmar. Nor indeed anywhere on the 2,330-mile (3,750-km) diagonal that connects both dots. The Hu Line is as invisible as it is imaginary.

Yet the point that the Hu Line makes is as relevant as when it was first imagined. Back in 1935, a Chinese demographer called Hu Huanyong used a hand-drawn map of the line to illustrate his article on 'The Distribution of China's Population' in the Chinese Journal of Geography.

The point of the article, and of the map: China's population is distributed unevenly, and not just a little, but a lot. Soos, baie.

  • The area to the west of the line comprised 64 percent of China's territory but contained only 4 percent of the country's population.
  • Inversely, 96 percent of the Chinese lived east of the 'geo-demographic demarcation line', as Hu called it, on just 36 percent of the land.

Much has changed in China in the intervening near-century. The weak post-imperial republic is now a highly centralized world power. Its population has nearly tripled, from around 500 million to almost 1.4 billion. But the fundamentals of the imbalance have remained virtually the same.

Even if China's territory has not: in 1946, China recognized the independence of Mongolia, shrinking the area west of the Hu Line. Still, in 2015, the distribution was as follows:

  • West of the line, 6 percent of the population on 57 percent of the territory (average population density: 39.6 inhabitants per square mile (15.3/km2).
  • East of the line, 94 percent of the population on 43 percent of the territory (average population density: 815.3 inhabitants per square mile (314.8/km2).

Persistent dichotomy

Hu Huanyong's original hand-drawn map of China, showing population density and the now-famous line (enhanced for visibility).

Credit: Chinese Journal of Geography (1935) – public domain.

Why is this demographic dichotomy so persistent? In two words: climate and terrain. East of the line, the land is flatter and wetter, meaning it's easier to farm, hence easier to produce enough food for an ever-larger population. West of the line: deserts, mountains, and plateaus. Much harsher terrain with a drier climate to boot, making it much harder to sustain large amounts of people.

And where the people are, all the rest follows. East of the line is virtually all of China's infrastructure and economy. At night, satellites see the area to the east twinkle with lantern-like strings of light, while the west is a blanket of near total darkness, only occasionally pierced by signs of life. In China's 'Wild West', per-capita GDP is 15 percent lower on average than in the industrious east.

An additional factor typifies China's population divide: while the country overall is ethnically very homogenous – 92 percent are Han Chinese – most of the 8 percent that make up China's ethnic minorities live west of the line. This is notably the case in Tibet and Xinjiang, two nominally autonomous regions with non-Han ethnic majorities.

This combination of economic and ethnic imbalances means the Hu Line is not just a persistent quirk, but a potential problem – at least from Beijing's perspective. Culturally and geographically distant from the country's east, Tibetans and Uyghurs have registered strong opposition to China's centralizing tendencies, often resulting in heavy-handed repression.

Long-term strategy

Street view in Tengchong, on China's border with Myanmar.

Credit: China Photos/Getty Images

But repression is not the central government's long-term strategy. Its plan is to pacify by progress. China's 'Manifest Destiny' has a name. In 1999, Jiang Zemin, then Secretary-General of the Chinese Communist Party, launched the 'Develop the West' campaign. The idea behind the slogan retains its political currency. In the last decade, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang has repeatedly urged the country to "break through" the Hu Line, in order to modernize China's western half.

The development strategy has an economic angle – adding industry and infrastructure to raise the region's per-capita GDP to the nation's average. But the locals fear that progress will bring population change: an influx of enough internal migrants from the east to tip the local ethnic balance to their disadvantage.

China's ethnic minorities are officially recognized and enjoy certain rights however, if they become minorities in their own regions, those will mean little more than the right to perform folklore songs and dances. The Soviets were past masters in this technique.

Will China follow the same path? That question will be answered if and when the Hu Line fades from relevance, by how much of the west's ethnic diversity will have been sacrificed for economic progress.

Strange Maps #1071



Kommentaar:

  1. Bartel

    Die verstaanbare boodskap

  2. Kristoffer

    Why?

  3. Calvino

    hallo almal !!!!!!!!!!

  4. Gukora

    die skrywer. )) Ek het jou blog by boekmerke gevoeg en 'n gereelde leser geword :)

  5. Micheal

    Dit maak nie sin nie.



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